Holly Ruocco - Page 12

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               Petitioner contends that the Court’s statements in the                 
          conference telephone call concerning burden of proof indicate               
          bias in favor of respondent and prejudice against petitioner.               
          She apparently draws this inference because the Court’s                     
          statements coincided with statements made by respondent in                  
          letters that were sent to petitioner by respondent during the               
          course of trial preparation.  Those letters were not seen by the            
          Court until respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed.  Both                 
          respondent’s letters and the Court’s statement were based on well           
          established law and are thus not grounds for recusal.  See, e.g.,           
          Noli v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); United                 
          States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976); Rowlee v.              
          Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1117, and cases cited in n.4 (1983).            
               Petitioner’s unrelenting view of the burden of proof in this           
          case has no merit.  That contention made in indistinguishable               
          circumstances was thoroughly discussed in Johnston v.                       
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-315, cited in respondent’s November           
          2001 letter to petitioner, as follows:                                      
               it is * * * clear that the Commissioner may satisfy the                
               predicate evidence requirement in unreported income                    
               cases by introducing evidence linking the taxpayer to                  
               tax-generating acts.  See Shriver v. Commissioner, 85                  
               T.C. 1, 4 (1985).  Alternatively, respondent may                       
               satisfy the predicate evidence requirement by showing                  
               the taxpayer was connected to unexplained bank deposits                
               or cash.  See Schad v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 609, 618-                 

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