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Discussion
Petitioner contends that the Court’s statements in the
conference telephone call concerning burden of proof indicate
bias in favor of respondent and prejudice against petitioner.
She apparently draws this inference because the Court’s
statements coincided with statements made by respondent in
letters that were sent to petitioner by respondent during the
course of trial preparation. Those letters were not seen by the
Court until respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed. Both
respondent’s letters and the Court’s statement were based on well
established law and are thus not grounds for recusal. See, e.g.,
Noli v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976); Rowlee v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1117, and cases cited in n.4 (1983).
Petitioner’s unrelenting view of the burden of proof in this
case has no merit. That contention made in indistinguishable
circumstances was thoroughly discussed in Johnston v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-315, cited in respondent’s November
2001 letter to petitioner, as follows:
it is * * * clear that the Commissioner may satisfy the
predicate evidence requirement in unreported income
cases by introducing evidence linking the taxpayer to
tax-generating acts. See Shriver v. Commissioner, 85
T.C. 1, 4 (1985). Alternatively, respondent may
satisfy the predicate evidence requirement by showing
the taxpayer was connected to unexplained bank deposits
or cash. See Schad v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 609, 618-
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