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be into a sword”. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758
(1983); see Steinbrecher v. Commissioner, supra; Traficant v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 501 (1987), affd. 884 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.
1989).
The matters deemed stipulated in this case, in addition to
satisfying respondent’s burden of presenting predicate evidence
connecting petitioner to the income determined by respondent,
lead us to conclude that the income in question was community
property, only half of which is taxable to petitioner. The
stipulated facts and exhibits establish that the amounts
deposited went into accounts controlled by petitioner and her
former husband, both of whom were performing services for Canyon
State Chiropractic. Whether the services were performed by
petitioner or by her former husband, payments received for those
services constituted community property. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
sec. 25-211 (2000). Although respondent’s counsel speculated
that there might be an agreement between the parties with respect
to community income, such agreement would be unlikely to allocate
all of the income to petitioner. We conclude, therefore, that
the decision to be entered in this case should reflect
recomputation of petitioner’s tax liability based on attributing
to her one-half of the bank deposits originally determined to be
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