- 31 -
��1812(c)(1), 1881. [Tate & Lyle, Inc. & Subs. v.
Commissioner, supra at 661.]
Following this rationale, the Commissioner argued in Tate & Lyle,
Inc. that even without section 267(a)(3) and section 1.267(a)-3,
Income Tax Regs., the taxpayer’s interest could only be deducted
when paid.2 Id.
In Tate & Lyle, Inc., we explained in great detail why
section 1.267(a)-3, Income Tax Regs., goes well beyond applying
the matching principle defined in section 267(a)(2). On the
basis of that analysis, I believe that the portion of the
regulations that would preclude petitioner from accruing and
deducting the interest in question is manifestly beyond the
statutory authorization and therefore is invalid. See Rite Aid
Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
WELLS, COHEN, CHIECHI, and VASQUEZ, JJ., agree with this
dissenting opinion.
2In Tate & Lyle, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, supra, we
rejected this argument, and it appears that the majority in the
instant case also rejects any argument that petitioner’s claimed
interest deduction would be disallowed under sec. 267(a)(2) even
without enactment of sec. 267(a)(3) and sec. 1.267(a)-3, Income
Tax Regs.
Page: Previous 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Last modified: May 25, 2011