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& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). In determining
whether the statute is clear for purposes of the Chevron
doctrine, the Supreme Court reiterated the “fundamental canon” of
statutory construction that “the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme” and that a reviewing court performing a Chevron
analysis must “fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious
whole”. Id. at 133 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court
enunciated the further principle that “the meaning of one statute
may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has
spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand”.
Id. “At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of
plausible meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can
shape or focus those meanings.” Id. at 143.
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court in Brown &
Williamson concluded that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch.
675, 52 Stat. 1040 (Act) (1938), currently codified at 21 U.S.C.
secs. 301, 321(g) and (h), 393 (2000), must be interpreted under
Chevron to preclude Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory
authority over tobacco, even though the Act gave the FDA
authority to regulate “drugs” and “combination products” and
defined those terms in a manner that on its face might appear to
cover nicotine and cigarettes, respectively. The Supreme Court
reached this conclusion because, notwithstanding that nicotine
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