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may, under the principles of Brown & Williamson, be interpreted
as altering the precise contours of section 267(a)(2) for
purposes of applying the Chevron doctrine. That is, when
considered in isolation, section 267(a)(2) may well appear to
describe a “matching principle” applicable only to mismatches
caused by the payee’s method of accounting, but when the
subsequent enactment of section 267(a)(3) is brought to bear on
(a)(2)’s meaning, that meaning may thereby have been “shaped” to
include something broader, especially if (a)(3) must be construed
to harmonize with the rest of the statute and avoid redundancy.
Thus, giving due regard to the Supreme Court’s admonition in FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., supra at 133, to “fit * * *
all parts into an harmonious whole” and to consider the effect of
subsequent enactments when undertaking step one of a Chevron
analysis, we conclude that the meaning of section 267(a)(3) is
not clear. If that section is to be construed to avoid
redundancy, then the intent of Congress in authorizing
regulations thereunder is uncertain.
b. Chevron, Second Step
In light of our conclusion that section 267(a)(3) is
unclear, we proceed to the second step of the Chevron analysis.
5(...continued)
1812(c), 100 Stat. 2834. Both were effective retroactively to
taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1983. Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, sec. 174(c), 98 Stat. 707-708; Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 1881, 100 Stat. 2914.
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