Square D Company and Subsidiaries - Page 11




                                       - 11 -                                         
          entitled to deduct, during taxable years 1991 and 1992, interest            
          accrued on the 1991 and 1992 Subordinated Loans.3                           
               3. Tate & Lyle                                                         
               In Tate & Lyle I we held that section 1.267(a)-3, Income Tax           
          Regs., insofar as it required an accrual basis taxpayer to use              
          the cash method with respect to interest owed to a foreign person           
          that was exempt from U.S. tax pursuant to treaty, was invalid               
          because it was manifestly contrary to the statute.4  We reasoned            
          that the “matching principle” of section 267(a)(2) was as                   
          follows:  “An accrual basis taxpayer is not entitled to deduct              
          any amount if it is payable to a related person and, because of             
          the payee’s method of accounting, the item is not currently                 
          includible in the payee’s gross income.”  Tate & Lyle I at 667.             
          Further, we found the mandate in section 267(a)(3) that the                 
          Secretary apply this matching principle to be “absolutely clear”            
          on its face, thus confining the ambit of the regulations to those           
          situations where the failure of the payor’s deduction to “match”            
          the payee’s income inclusion was attributable to the payee’s                
          method of accounting.  Because section 1.267(a)-3’s restriction             

               3 In light of these stipulations, we do not consider the               
          impact, if any, of the fact that the interest on the 1991                   
          Subordinated Loan was owed to SNC rather than the Schneider                 
          Lenders.                                                                    
               4 We also held in the alternative that the regulation was              
          invalid because its retroactive application violated the Due                
          Process Clause of the Constitution.  The due process issue is not           
          present in the instant case.                                                





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011