Willamette Industries, Inc. - Page 11




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          sale was not an “involuntary conversion” within the meaning of              
          section 1033 so that the gain had to be recognized and could not            
          be deferred.  In so holding, it was explained that the damage to            
          the taxpayer’s ship was insufficient to compel the taxpayer to              
          sell and, accordingly, the sale was not involuntary.  Id. at 476.           
          In that setting, “involuntary conversion” under section 1033 was            
          defined to mean “that the taxpayer’s property, through some                 
          outside force or agency beyond his control, is no longer useful             
          or available to him for his purposes.”  Id.; see also Wheeler v.            
          Commissioner, 58 T.C. 459, 462-463 (1972) (where it was held that           
          the taxpayer’s choice to destroy his building was not an                    
          involuntary conversion).                                                    
               In S.H. Kress & Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 142, 153                  
          (1963), we held that condemnation of the taxpayer’s property was            
          imminent and unavoidable, and that the only realistic                       
          alternatives were to either await condemnation or to sell to an             
          appropriate buyer.  We found that those circumstances met the               
          “compulsorily or involuntarily converted” requirement of section            
          1033, (citing Masser v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 741 (1958)).                  
          Accordingly, even though a taxpayer has choices or alternatives a           
          disposition may be deemed involuntary so that section 1033 relief           
          remains available.                                                          
               Masser v. Commissioner, supra, involved section 112(f)(1) of           
          the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (another predecessor of section           






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