Willamette Industries, Inc. - Page 14




                                       - 14 -                                         
               get.  Unlike the situation in Willis, the sale of the                  
               downed timber was dictated by the damage caused by the                 
               hurricane. [Rev. Rul. 80-175, supra, 1980-2 C.B. at                    
               232.]                                                                  
               The taxpayer in the 1980 ruling apparently intended to grow            
          trees and/or hold timberland for sale at a particular maturity.             
          The hurricane caused the taxpayer to involuntarily sell/use the             
          trees prior to the time intended for harvest or sale.  The                  
          taxpayer’s intended purpose or use was only affected as to                  
          timing, and the sale was prior to the time the taxpayer intended            
          to sell or harvest.                                                         
               Returning to the disagreement here, petitioner contends                
          that, at the time of the damage, it did not intend to harvest the           
          damaged trees, so that the conversion was involuntary and within            
          the meaning of the statute.10  Petitioner argues that a taxpayer            
          may not have a choice as to whether to dispose of damaged                   
          property, but a taxpayer may have a choice as to how to dispose             
          of damaged property.                                                        
               Respondent contends that petitioner should not be entitled             
          to such deferral because of its choice to further process the               


               10 Petitioner also relies on the published revenue rulings             
          and on a number of private letter rulings (PLRs), which it                  
          contends permitted sec. 1033 deferral in factual circumstances              
          substantially similar to those we consider here.  On brief, the             
          parties devoted a relatively large portion of their arguments to            
          discussing the PLRs.  Although we have considered the rationale             
          used by the parties in discussing the rulings, the parties and              
          the Court are statutorily proscribed from citing the PLRs as                
          precedent.  See sec. 6110(k)(3).                                            





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011