Bank One Corporation - Page 152

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               should play no role in the fair market values at which                 
               it trades.                                                             
                    The petitioner’s expert analysis suggests that                    
               Silver should make a downward credit adjustment in                     
               market value (from zero) associated with the potential                 
               default of counterparty Z, disregarding its own lower                  
               credit quality.  Again, this is incorrect.  The                        
               petitioner’s experts rely on the argument that if the                  
               low-quality dealer Silver were to attempt to “sell”                    
               (that is, assign its position in) its swap with Z to                   
               the higher-quality dealer Gilt, then Gilt “would not be                
               influenced to pay more or less” because of Silver’s                    
               credit rating, because, if it purchased this swap from                 
               Silver, it would not be extending credit to Silver.                    
               * * *  There is a logical fallacy here.  Silver had                    
               already been receiving, in terms of expected credit                    
               exposure, an effective extension of credit from Z,                     
               which was worth P to Silver, net of the value of the                   
               effective credit it had offered Z.  If Silver were to                  
               ask Gilt to assume its position in the swap, it would                  
               demand P in return for the net loss in market value on                 
               the extension of credit by Z.  Then, before completing                 
               the deal with Silver, Gilt would turn to counterparty Z                
               and ask for an up front payment of P in return for                     
               relieving Z of its net exposure to Silver, in the event                
               that the re-assignment of the swap from Silver to Gilt                 
               were to occur.  Since Z would indeed benefit from this                 
               net reduction in credit risk that is worth P, Z would                  
               agree to pay P to Gilt, contingent on the re-                          
               assignment.  All three parties would then consummate                   
               the trade.  Gilt would now be paying a fixed rate R to                 
               Z on a fixed-for-floating swap, and have gotten into                   
               this contract for a net price of 0.  This is of course                 
               the same price (zero) at which Gilt and Z would have                   
               signed the swap contract in the first place.  Of                       
               course, there is some doubt in practice whether all                    
               three counterparties would take the trouble to make                    
               such contingent assignment arrangements, and indeed it                 
               is unusual to see swap assignments, where there is a                   
               material difference in the credit qualities of the                     
               assignor and assignee.  This does not lessen the “moral                
               of the story,” which is that Silver’s own credit                       
               quality does indeed play a role in determining the                     
               market value of its swap with Z.                                       
                    Now, going back to the swap between Z and the low-                
               quality dealer Silver, suppose that interest rates fall                





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Last modified: May 25, 2011