- 18 -
standard of recklessness for imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
section 1927. Id. (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp.,
792 F.2d 1137, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). We observed that if the
venue for appeal was not the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, it would likely be the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
had applied a bad faith standard in cases arising under 28 U.S.C.
section 1927. Id. Since the taxpayer’s counsel’s conduct
amounted to bad faith as defined by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, a higher standard than recklessness, and we were
uncertain of appropriate venue, we applied a bad faith standard
for purposes of that case. See id.
In our opinion in Edwards v. Commissioner, supra, we
observed that in the view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or
recklessly raises a frivolous argument. Id. (citing In re Keegan
Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996)). We
found that Ms. Spaid knowingly and recklessly made frivolous
arguments in pretrial memoranda, at trial, and in posttrial
briefs. In making these arguments, Ms. Spaid cited no relevant
supporting authority, and she either failed to perform the basic
research to discover or failed to disclose the substantial bodies
of authority specifically rejecting her arguments as frivolous.
Accordingly, we found the standard for bad faith used by the
Page: Previous 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011