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requested in the summons, and then cried foul when respondent did
not issue a 30-day letter, claiming he was not afforded an
opportunity for administrative review by respondent’s Appeals
Office.
In response to respondent’s affidavit, petitioner filed an
“Affidavit in Appellant’s Response to Sanctioned Pursual”. As if
to put himself in the worst possible light, petitioner chose to
respond to respondent’s affidavit of attorney’s fees by
advancing, to the extent the submission is coherent, the same
frivolous arguments we described as tax protester arguments
justifying imposition of sanctions under section 6673(a)(1). We
will not address these frivolous arguments again.
In our opinion in Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-
169, we suggested that petitioner’s belated attempts to cooperate
with respondent at trial and posttrial by entering into a partial
stipulation of settled issues finally conceding the abusive trust
issue were mitigating factors that would be taken into account in
imposing a penalty. However, the penalty must be substantial for
it to have a deterrent effect. Takaba v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.
285, 295 (2002) (citing Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71
(7th Cir. 1986)). The purpose of section 6673(a)(1) is to compel
taxpayers who litigate in our Court to conform their conduct to
well-settled rules. Id. In setting the penalty, we have
considered respondent’s affidavit of attorney’s fees, discussed
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