- 7 - section 1016(a)(1)(relating to adjustments to basis of property). Respondent contends that petitioner cannot meet the requirements of section 177(a) because it was not taxable in 1983 and 1984 when its expenditures were incurred. Neither party cites court opinions supporting its respective interpretations of section 177, and the issue appears to be one of first impression. It is a well-settled principle that tax deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers must show that they come squarely within the terms of the law conferring the benefit sought. See Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Wilkins v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 109, 112 (2003). Further, in interpreting a statute, as in the instant cases, we start as always with the language of the statute itself. Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. ___, ___ (Sept. 4, 2003). We look to the legislative history primarily to learn the purpose of the statute and to resolve any ambiguity in the words contained in the text. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at ___; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 69, 89 (2003); Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1, 7 (2002). If the language of the statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, we generally apply it according to its terms.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Next
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