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issue we might agree.5 But the issue here is whether petitioner
meets the substantive requirements of section 177(a).
Petitioner argues that the language in section 177(a),
referring to a taxable year, must be read in its full context.
Petitioner points to the following language in section 177(a):
“Any trademark or trade name expenditure paid or incurred during
a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1955”. (Emphasis
added.) Petitioner argues that this language merely establishes
the effective date of section 177. See Act of June 29, 1956, ch.
464, sec. 4, 70 Stat. 406. We disagree. While the above quoted
language certainly specifies that section 177 applies only to
expenditures made after December 31, 1955, it also specifies that
qualifying expenditures be paid or incurred during a “taxable
year” after that date. We cannot simply read this requirement
out of the statute. Petitioner cites no authority for doing so,
and there is nothing in the legislative history indicating that
Congress intended such a limited application.
5See Dougherty v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 917 (1973) (election
held effective where filed in response to the Commissioner’s
indication of intention to include additional amount in the
taxpayer’s return years after time prescribed in regulations for
making the election); see also Roy H. Park Broad. v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1093 (1982) (election filed in amended
returns more than 4 years after filing of original return allowed
where taxpayer was unable to secure required certification at
time original return filed); Bayley v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 288
(1960) (election to compute gain on installment basis which was
made in amended petition to this Court held effective where
taxpayer treated gain in original return as deferred under sec.
1034).
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