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analyze the transaction.” Accordingly, we hold that petitioner
did not in good faith or reasonably rely on Becker as an expert
or qualified professional working in the area of his expertise to
establish the fair market value of the recyclers and the
viability or bona fides of the SAB transactions. Becker never
assumed such responsibility, and he fully described the
particulars of his investigation, taking care not to
mischaracterize it as “due diligence”.
In the end, petitioner indirectly and Becker directly relied
upon PI personnel for the value of the recyclers and the economic
viability of the SAB Foam transactions. See Vojticek v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-444, to the effect that advice from
such persons “is better classified as sales promotion.” As
explained above, Becker did not have any education, special
qualifications, or professional skills in plastics materials or
plastics recycling. A taxpayer may rely upon his adviser’s
advice and expertise (in this case accounting and tax advice)
only where such reliance is objectively reasonable, but it is not
reasonable or prudent to rely upon a tax adviser regarding
matters outside his field of expertise or with respect to facts
that he does not verify. See Addington v. Commissioner, 205 F.3d
at 58; Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d at 408; Skeen v.
Commissioner, 864 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1989), affg. Patin v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1086 (1987); Lax v. Commissioner, T.C.
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