H. Robert Feinberg - Page 37

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               4.  Cohen and Lewin                                                    
               Petitioner also relied upon his partners Cohen and Lewin.13            
          Cohen’s knowledge of the transaction was derived from his review            
          of the memorandum and his discussions with Becker.  In addition,            
          Cohen testified that Becker told him he could rely on the                   
          valuations attached to the memorandum.14  We already have                   
          established, though, that petitioner may not reasonably rely on             
          Becker’s advice.  Since Cohen himself lacked the expertise and              
          knowledge of the pertinent facts to provide informed advice to              
          petitioner, any advice he gave petitioner about SAB Foam plainly            
          was of very limited value.  See David v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d              
          788 (2d Cir. 1995).  Cohen was a partner and a coinvestor rather            
          than an adviser on whom petitioner could rely with respect to the           
          transaction here.                                                           
               We also hold that it was not reasonable for petitioner to              
          rely upon the advice received from Lewin.  As an associate for              
          Miller & Summit, Lewin may have learned about business practices            

               13  Petitioner testified that “there was a very, very close            
          professional as well as a personal and social relationship among            
          us” and that they “shared information on a daily basis”.                    
               14  We note that Cohen testified:  “I remember we talked               
          about the valuations that were obtained and I remember him                  
          telling me in words or in substance that I could rely on those              
          valuations.”  We consider Cohen’s testimony inconsistent with               
          Becker’s testimony, and as to this matter we consider Becker’s              
          testimony reliable and Cohen’s alleged recollection unreliable.             
          See supra note 10 to the effect that this problem was known to              
          petitioner and his counsel, who chose not to call upon Becker for           
          clarifying testimony.                                                       





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