Damian Gerard and Leigh H. Gerard - Page 14

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                                       OPINION                                        
               Petitioners argue that the amounts that Katherine and Damian           
          received pursuant to the settlement agreement with Maritz Inc.              
          were entirely on account of personal injuries within the meaning            
          of section 104(a)(2) and so are excludable from income.                     
          Petitioners bear the burden of proof.  See Rule 142(a).4                    
          I.  General Principles                                                      
               Except as otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Internal             
          Revenue Code, gross income means income from all sources.  Sec.             
          61(a).  This statutory provision is construed broadly, unlike               
          statutory exclusions from income, which are construed narrowly.             
          See Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995).                     
               Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income “the amount of            
          any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as           
          lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal                   
          injuries or sickness”.  This provision excludes from gross income           
          only amounts that are received both:  (1) Through prosecution or            
          settlement of an action based upon tort or tort type rights; and            
          (2) on account of personal injuries or sickness.  Commissioner v.           
          Schleier, supra at 333; Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 416           


               4 Respondent’s examination of petitioners’ 1994 returns                
          commenced before July 22, 1998.  Consequently, sec. 7491(a),                
          which in some circumstances may place the burden of proof on the            
          Commissioner, has no application here.  See Internal Revenue                
          Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,              
          sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727.                                                





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