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1995).6 We need not decide whether Katherine would have been
able to sustain a claim for wrongful discharge, since it is the
nature of the claim and not its validity that matters for present
purposes. See, e.g., Mayberry v. United States, supra at 859
n.3. We conclude that Katherine asserted a bona fide tort claim
for wrongful discharge and that Maritz Inc. recognized it as
such.7
Similarly, Damian’s claim for interference with his
employment relationship falls within a larger category of claims
for tortious interference with a business relationship. Such
tort claims are recognized under Missouri law. See Salomon v.
Crown Life Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 1233, 1238 (8th Cir. 1976);
Fischer, Spuhl, Herzwurm & Associates, Inc. v. Forrest T. Jones &
Co., 586 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Mo. 1979).
In sum, we conclude that the first element of Schleier is
met with respect to the various claims asserted on Katherine’s
6 Noting that it had neither “expressly defined nor adopted
the exception”, the Missouri Supreme Court in Luethans v. Wash.
Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169, 171 n.2 (Mo. 1995), stated that for
purposes of that opinion “we assume that the public policy
exception to the at-will employment doctrine exists.”
7 Millard Backerman, the attorney who represented Maritz
Inc. in the settlement negotiations, testified that he believed
that he made inquiries at his law firm during the negotiations as
to whether an at-will employee could have a cause of action for
wrongful discharge in Missouri and was told “there is that
possibility on some kind of a specialized tort action.”
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