Edward P. Knoll and Mary K. King-Knoll - Page 28

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         the lender must intend to enforce repayment.  See Haag v.                    
         Commissioner, 88 T.C. 604, 615 (1987), affd. without published               
         opinion 855 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1988).                                        
               The record reflects that Winston did not intend to enforce             
         repayment of the advances made to petitioner.  The most                      
         compelling indication of this fact is that Winston included the              
         full amount of the advances in petitioner’s Form K-1 for the                 
         partnership’s tax year ending January 31, 1993.  Winston also                
         refused Mr. Knoll’s request to recharacterize the payments as a              
         loan or as a payment for a release of a tort-type personal injury            
         claim.  In addition, section 2(f) of the final settlement                    
         agreement allocates the $48,420 of payments as in satisfaction of            
         items including “salary, draw, guarantee, bonus * * * partnership            
         income or profits, fees, fee participation”.  These facts do not             
         support characterizing the proceeds as a loan.                               
               Other facts add additional support for the conclusion that             
         Winston did not intend the advances to be loans.  Petitioner                 
         signed acknowledgments of receipt each time he received a payment            
         from Winston.  Notably, the forms did not include terms of                   
         repayment, did not require petitioner to pay interest, and did               
         not require petitioner to pledge collateral.  While the                      
         acknowledgments stated that each payment would be recaptured from            
         any lump-sum payment the firm may agree to pay petitioner, in                
         light of other more compelling evidence, this fact is not                    






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