William G. Koenig - Page 15




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          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-459.  Petitioner’s failure to do so           
          after the filing of respondent’s motion for summary judgment is             
          contrary to Rule 121(d) and justifies summary judgment for                  
          respondent on this issue.4  See Kiley v. Commissioner, supra.               
               Petitioner also challenges “the appropriateness of the                 
          collection action”.  Again, however, he fails to allege any facts           
          in support of this assignment of error.  See Rule 331(b)(5).                
          Moreover, he fails to suggest any alternative means of                      
          collection.5  See, e.g., sec. 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii).  As before,               
          petitioner’s failure to do so after the filing of respondent’s              


               4  Even if petitioner were permitted to challenge his                  
          underlying tax liabilities, it is clear that the arguments he has           
          advanced (see supra Background, “A”) are frivolous and                      
          groundless.  E.g., Keene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-277.              
          In addition, petitioner’s argument that the notice of deficiency            
          was invalid because it was not signed by the Secretary or someone           
          with delegated authority from the Secretary is itself frivolous             
          and groundless.  See Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 165-             
          166 (2002).                                                                 
               5  We regard as nothing other than tax protest theatrics,              
          petitioner’s assertion that he was “prepared to pay the tax at              
          issue” if only the Appeals officer would show him “where my                 
          liability is.”                                                              
               Regarding petitioner’s liability, suffice it to say: (1)               
          Petitioner is a taxpayer subject to the Federal income tax; see             
          secs. 1(c), 7701(a)(1), (14); (2) compensation for labor or                 
          services rendered constitutes income subject to the Federal                 
          income tax; sec. 61(a)(1); United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d                
          1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981); see also sec. 61(a)(4); (3)                     
          petitioner is required to file an income tax return; sec.                   
          6012(a)(1); and (4) the Commissioner and his agents are                     
          authorized to enforce the provisions of the Internal Revenue                
          Code; see I.R.C. chs. 78, 80.  See Davich v. Commissioner, T.C.             
          Memo. 2002-255; see also Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417,              
          1417 (5th Cir. 1984).                                                       





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