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the fact that petitioners were not parties to this agreement, and
that this agreement was executed by the donees more than 2 months
after the transfer.4
The majority state that the property transferred to CFT
“was not expressed as a specific fraction of the gifted interest
(e.g., one-twentieth), nor did petitioners transfer to CFT a
specific assignee interest in MIL (e.g., a 3-percent assignee
interest).” Majority op. p. 61. The majority appear to assert,
without any authority, that petitioners’ charitable deduction
cannot be determined unless the gifted interest is expressed in
terms of a percentage or fractional share.5 The assignment
agreement specifically identified the transferees and the
transferred property. Regardless of how the transferred interest
was described, it had an ascertainable value.
4 Subsequent events typically do not affect the value of
transferred property. See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279
U.S. 151 (1929); Estate of McMorris v. Commissioner, 243 F.3d
1254 (10th Cir. 2001), revg. T.C. Memo. 1999-82; Estate of Smith
v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999), revg. 108 T.C. 412
(1997); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
5 This position is reminiscent of previous attempts by
respondent to impose a fractional, or percentile, share rule in
the marital deduction context–-a position that was consistently
rejected by the courts and not implemented until Congress amended
sec. 2056 to conform with respondent’s position. See sec.
2056(b)(5), (7) and (10); Northeastern Pa. Natl. Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 387 U.S. 213 (1967); James v. United States,
366 U.S. 213 (1961); Estate of Alexander v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.
34 (1984), affd. without published opinion 760 F.2d 264 (4th Cir.
1985).
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