- 143 -
accounts, to conceal assets is evidence of fraud where petitioner
has unfettered control over those accounts.93 Temple v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-337, affd. 62 Fed. Appx. 605 (6th
Cir. 2003); Friedman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1968-145, affd.
421 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1970).
Petitioner used fictitious names in some of his real estate
dealings for the years in issue. Indeed, petitioner signed
various documents relating to real estate documents in the name
of “William R. Wright”, and he also notarized several documents
in that name. Petitioner also used the name “D.W. Davis” and
opened a bank account in that name. When asked about his use of
fictitious names, petitioner testified with respect to the name
“John Waltin” that it was not fictitious since “there’s probably
a John Waltin somewhere”. We find petitioner’s testimony not
credible, and we find that he used those fictitious names for the
purpose of concealing income and property transactions. See
Milito v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-145 (“The use of aliases
93Petitioner argues that his use of trusts is not evidence
of fraud, since “the practice of owning property through nominees
and trustees was widespread and common.” We might agree that the
use of trusts alone does not establish fraudulent intent;
however, the use of trusts in combination with evidence of the
concealment of assets and sale proceeds provides persuasive
evidence of fraud. Further, it does not follow from the frequent
use of the trust vehicle to hold property in Florida that
petitioner’s use of the trust vehicle was not fraudulent.
Indeed, the use of trusts does not necessarily involve the same
circumstances that exist with respect to petitioner’s use,
notably the failure to report income and the failure to file
appropriate returns.
Page: Previous 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011