- 14 -
Hence, critical components of the analysis in Tex. Carbonate Co.
v. Phinney, supra, are consistent with the current regulatory
approach to officers and contrary to petitioner’s position.
Second, from a factual standpoint, even if the common law
control factor were pertinent to our evaluation, petitioner has
failed to establish a lack of control over Stark in the
performance of his services. As in Joseph M. Grey Pub.
Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at 128-129, to accept
petitioner’s contentions in this regard would be the equivalent
of disregarding the corporate form in which Stark chose to
conduct his business. Caselaw does not permit a taxpayer to use
his or her dual role as a shareholder of and service provider to
a corporation as grounds for ignoring the legal ramifications of
the business construct so selected. Moline Props., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-439 (1943); Joseph M. Grey Pub.
Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at 129.
3. Application of Section 3121(d)(1)
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, application of
section 3121(d)(1) is not precluded or limited here by
considerations pertaining to Stark’s status as an S corporation
shareholder or under the common law. Section 3121(d)(1) and
sections 31.3121(d)-1(b) and 31.3306(i)-1(e), Employment Tax
Regs., specify that corporate officers are to be classified as
employees if they perform more than minor services and receive or
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