Nu-look Design, Inc. - Page 17




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          reasonably looked to common law control concepts in classifying             
          Stark.                                                                      
               For the reasons previously discussed, Tex. Carbonate Co. v.            
          Phinney, supra, does not afford a reasonable basis for disregard            
          of the explicit rules of section 3121(d)(1) and sections                    
          31.3121(d)-1(b) and 31.3306(i)-1(e), Employment Tax Regs.                   
          Equally unavailing in this regard is Automated Typesetting, Inc.            
          v. United States, supra.  The District Court in that case simply            
          evaluated the employment relationship of the involved individuals           
          both through a common law analysis and through application of the           
          provisions relating to corporate officers.  Id. at 519-522.  In             
          deciding that the individuals qualified as employees under either           
          rubric, the court did not repudiate the statutory treatment of              
          corporate executives.  Id. at 520, 522; see also Joseph M. Grey             
          Pub. Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at 129 n.5.                    
               Moreover, even if we were to assume arguendo that the cited            
          cases could offer a reasonable basis for treating an officer as a           
          nonemployee, petitioner has failed to establish reliance on the             
          claimed precedent as a factual matter.  To fall within the safe             
          harbors of Section 530(a)(2), the taxpayer must have relied on              
          the alleged authority during the periods in issue, at the time              
          the employment decisions were being made.  The statute does not             
          countenance ex post facto justification.  See 303 W. 42nd St.               
          Enters., Inc. v. IRS, 181 F.3d 272, 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1999)                 






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