Nu-look Design, Inc. - Page 20




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               In seeking to establish a reasonable basis for Stark’s                 
          treatment apart from the safe havens, petitioner quotes from the            
          following definition of “employment status” in Section 530(c)(2):           
          “The term ‘employment status’ means the status of an individual,            
          under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the              
          employer-employee relationship, as an employee or as an                     
          independent contractor (or other individual who is not an                   
          employee).”  Petitioner apparently believes that the purported              
          lack of common law control makes its treatment of Stark                     
          reasonable within the meaning of Section 530 and that the above             
          definition supports this view.                                              
               Again, however, petitioner’s approach is contrary to                   
          controlling statutes and to the facts of this case.  As a matter            
          of construction, Section 530(c)(2) defines employment status for            
          purposes of certain provisions of Section 530 not germane here.             
          It does not purport to override or interpret the definition of              
          “employee” in section 3121(d) and related regulations.  Hence,              
          Section 530(c)(2) does not render it rational for petitioner to             
          have ignored the statutory mandate regarding corporate officers             
          and to have taken a position that was not otherwise supported by            
          authority.  Petitioner also does not claim in actuality to have             
          relied on Section 530(c)(2) in deciding not to treat Stark as an            
          employee in 1996, 1997, or 1998.  We conclude and have found as a           
          fact that petitioner did not have a reasonable basis for failing            






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