- 27 - capital gain under section 356(a)(1)(B) and (2).15 That argument depends upon a finding that the $40,011 of assets listed on the 1989 return balance sheet continued to exist in November 1990, and were, in fact, distributed to petitioner at that time. Petitioner denies that he received any distribution from 2618 in connection with its transfer of the club to JKP. Respondent simply states that the assets reflected on the 1989 return balance sheet “must have gone somewhere, and the only logical recipient would be the petitioner as the sole owner of the stock of * * * [2618].” A more plausible argument (and a reasonable inference) is that such assets (assuming they still existed in November 1990) were transferred to JKP as part of 2618's transfer of the operation of the club. That is certainly true with respect to such business-related assets as “inventories” (presumably consisting of food and liquor) ($4,175), current accounts receivable ($1,296), and “depreciable assets less accumulated depreciation” ($8,647) (an asset the very 15 As we have previously noted in discussing the constructive dividend issue (section II, supra), petitioner had a zero basis for his 2618 stock, and respondent concedes that 2618 was without earnings and profits on the date of the alleged distribution. Under such circumstances, sec. 356(a)(1)(B) provides for gain recognition up to the “sum of * * * money and the fair market value of * * * property” distributed, and sec. 356(a)(2) provides that “the gain recognized * * * shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property.” Because petitioner’s holding period for his 2618 stock exceeded 12 months as of November 1990, such gain would be long-term capital gain. See Gross v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 756, 768 (1955), affd. 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956).Page: Previous 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Next
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