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offensive collateral estoppel when the current defendant was
previously successful. Petitioners freely admit that they found
no case law allowing for such an application. Additionally,
petitioners have not presented a persuasive argument or
sufficient rationale for this Court to adopt a use of offensive
collateral estoppel, which is the antithesis of that determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, supra. As the Government was successful in the
previous action against Jay Hoyt, petitioners are precluded from
asserting offensive collateral estoppel against respondent.
Further, petitioners seek to apply the nonmutual form of
offensive collateral estoppel against respondent to establish the
existence of a theft from the partnerships. Petitioners claim
that language in United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984),
allows nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel in certain
situations.
Petitioners assert, yet present no authority, that Mendoza
has been limited by some courts “to situations where the policy
concerns of the Court exist.” Petitioners cite, exempli gratia,
NLRB v. Donna Lee Sportswear Co., 836 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1987),
for the proposition that “Mendoza has been limited in application
to require mutuality only where important issues of law are at
stake.” However, petitioners fail to cite the many cases from
this Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
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