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wherein an appeal in the instant case would lie, which support a
quite different interpretation of Mendoza.
Contrary to petitioners’ construction of Mendoza, this Court
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have both on
numerous occasions interpreted Mendoza as holding that nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel may not be invoked against the
Government. See Natl. Med. Enter., Inc. v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d
542, 545 (9th Cir. 1990); Black Constr. Corp. v. INS, 746 F.2d
503, 504 (9th Cir. 1984); Kroh v. Commissioner, supra at 402;
McQuade v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 137, 144 (1985); Barrett-Crofoot
Invs. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-59. Accordingly, we
follow these cases and hold that petitioners may not invoke
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against respondent.
Assuming, arguendo, that in some circumstances nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel could be applied against
respondent, petitioners failed to show that all the conditions
for application of collateral estoppel have been met. See Peck
v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166-167 (1988). Specifically,
petitioners have not presented a persuasive argument that the
issue in the instant cases is “identical in all respects” with an
issue decided in Jay Hoyt’s criminal trial. Id. at 166.
Petitioners claim that respondent is estopped from
relitigating a theft from the partnerships, because Jay Hoyt was
“convicted of stealing all the money contributed to the
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