Charles W. and Nancy T. Smith - Page 6

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          the requirement of section 71(b)(1)(D) has not been satisfied               
          because the settlement agreement and the divorce decree are                 
          silent with respect to the obligation of petitioner to pay the              
          $32,000 in the event of the prior death of his former spouse.               
          Respondent further argues that, under Florida law, petitioner's             
          obligation to make the $32,000 payment would have continued in              
          the event of the prior death of petitioner's former spouse;                 
          therefore, under the facts and the State law of Florida, the                
          payment does not satisfy section 71(b)(1)(D).  Petitioners                  
          contend that, under Florida law, the prior death of the former              
          spouse would have terminated petitioner's obligation to pay the             
          $32,000; therefore, section 71(b)(1)(D) was satisfied.3                     
               As noted above, the settlement agreement and the divorce               
          decree are silent with respect to petitioner's obligation to pay            
          the $32,000 in the event his former spouse died before the                  
          payment was made.  Section 71(b)(1)(D) requires, as a condition             
          to qualify as alimony, that the obligation to pay terminates upon           
          the death of the former spouse.  If the payer is liable for even            
          one otherwise qualifying payment after the recipient's death,               
          none of the related payments required before death will be                  
          alimony.  Sec. 1.71-1T(b), Q&A-13, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 49           


               3    Respondent does not contend that the $32,000                      
          represented a division of property between petitioner and his               
          former spouse, in which event, the payment would not constitute             
          alimony.                                                                    





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