Capital Blue Cross and Subsidiaries - Page 19

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               1987.  The basis step-up is provided solely for                        
               purposes of determining gain or loss upon sale or                      
               exchange of the assets, not for purposes of determining                
               amounts of depreciation or for other purposes.  The                    
               basis adjustment is provided because the conferees                     
               believe that such formerly tax-exempt organizations                    
               should not be taxed on unrealized appreciation or                      
               depreciation that accrued during the period the                        
               organization was not generally subject to income                       
               taxation.  [H. Conf. Rept. 99-841 (Vol. II), at II-349-                
               II-350, 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) 1, 349-350; emphasis                      
               added.]                                                                

               Petitioner argues that the statutory language is not                   
          ambiguous and provides no limitation on the types of transactions           
          to which the basis step-up provision applies and therefore that             
          the limiting language in the legislative history is irrelevant.             
               In interpreting a statute, we look first to the language of            
          the statute, and we look only to legislative history to learn the           
          purpose of the statutory language or to resolve ambiguities in              
          the statutory language.  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,           
          340 (1997); Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,             
          447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 209            
          (3d Cir. 2002); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Commissioner,              
          121 T.C. 129, 134 (2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 120            
          T.C. 69, 89 (2003); Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1, 7 (2002).            
               If the language of a statute is plain, clear, and                      
          unambiguous, the statutory language is to be applied according to           
          its terms, United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,           
          241 (1989); Burke v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 41, 59 (1995), unless           
          a literal interpretation of the statutory language would lead to            





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