James Dirks - Page 7

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          itself.  This Court has applied the doctrine of substantial                 
          compliance to excuse taxpayers from strict compliance with                  
          procedural regulatory requirements such as the manner in which an           
          election must be made.  See Estate of Chamberlain v.                        
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-181 (and cases cited therein),                
          affd. 9 Fed. Appx. 713 (9th Cir. 2001).  Other Federal courts               
          also have applied the doctrine in the setting of regulatory                 
          requirements.  See id.                                                      
               Although neither party has argued that the substantial                 
          compliance doctrine may also apply in the setting of a statutory            
          requirement, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the                
          court to which an appeal of this case lies, has indicated that              
          the doctrine may apply to “statutory prerequisites”.  Sawyer v.             
          County of Sonoma, 719 F.2d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983).  However,            
          the court stated:                                                           
               in the context of statutory prerequisites, the doctrine                
               can be applied only where invocation thereof would not                 
               defeat the policies of the underlying statutory                        
               provisions.  * * *  In addition, the doctrine of                       
               substantial compliance can have no application in the                  
               context of a clear statutory prerequisite that is known                
               to the party seeking to apply the doctrine.  [Id.]                     
               Petitioner asserts that the choice of 60 days in the 60-day            
          rule was “arbitrary and procedural” and that the policy of the              
          statute is to promote the maintenance of funds in a retirement              
          account.  Petitioner concludes that this policy is preserved in             
          this case, given that he has paid the $118,000 into the second              






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