-8-
IRA, and that his failure to have met the 60-day rule is of no
consequence. We disagree with petitioner’s suggestion that we
may simply close our eyes to the 60-day period and focus blindly
on the fact that he has paid the withdrawn funds into the second
IRA. In addition to the fact that the 60-day rule is a
“fundamental element of the statutory requirements for an IRA
rollover contribution”, Metcalf v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2002-123, affd. 62 Fed. Appx. 811 (9th Cir. 2003), the 60-day
rule is a “clear statutory prerequisite” that was well known to
petitioner even before he withdrew the funds from the first IRA.
Moreover, an application of the substantial compliance
doctrine to a statutorily prescribed fixed deadline such as the
60-day rule is problematic. By analogy, the Supreme Court has
noted as to filing deadlines that “deadlines, like statutes of
limitations, necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily with
respect to individuals who fall just on the other side of them,
but if the concept of a filing deadline is to have any content,
the deadline must be enforced.” United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84, 100-101 (1985). In addition, as the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has noted:
All fixed deadlines seem harsh because all can be
missed by a whisker--by a day (United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985)) or
for that matter by an hour or a minute. They are
arbitrary by nature. * * * The legal system lives on
fixed deadlines; their occasional harshness is redeemed
by the clarity which they impart to legal obligation.
* * * There is no general judicial power to relieve
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