-9-
from deadlines fixed by legislatures * * * [Prussner
v. United States, 896 F.2d at 222-223.]
We conclude that we are not at liberty in this case to
ignore the 60-day deadline that Congress has prescribed clearly
and unequivocally in section 408(d)(3)(A)(i). Any modification
to that deadline is a legislative and not a judicial function.
See J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55, 59 (1940);
Xi v. United States, 298 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002); Prussner
v. United States, supra at 222-223; Kern v. Granquist, 291 F.2d
29, 33 (9th Cir. 1961). In fact, petitioner notes correctly that
Congress has recently amended section 408 to authorize the
Secretary to waive this 60-day period in certain cases. See sec.
408(d)(3)(I), as added by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-16, sec. 644(a),
115 Stat. 123. Given that this amendment applies only to
distributions after December 31, 2001, id.; see also Anderson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-171, it does not apply here. We
sustain respondent’s determination as to the deficiency.5
5 In addition to tax on petitioner’s receipt of the
$118,000, respondent determined as part of this deficiency that
petitioner was liable for the 10-percent additional tax under
sec. 72(t). Petitioner does not in his brief address this
determination, and we consider it conceded. Rybak v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 566 (1988); Money v. Commissioner,
89 T.C. 46, 48 (1987). We note, however, that the additional tax
generally applies to all distributions from an IRA, see sec.
72(t)(1), and that the record does not establish that any of the
exceptions to this general rule found in sec. 72(t)(2) are
applicable.
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