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supra, and Helvering v. N. Coal Co., supra),3 and that the
predecessors to this Court were mere administrative agencies that
lacked equitable powers to alter those rules, Lasky v.
Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), affd. per curiam
352 U.S. 1027 (1957). This jurisprudence also reflected the view
of some of the Courts of Appeals that this Court’s predecessors
3 Helvering v. N. Coal Co., 293 U.S. 191 (1934), concerned
four cases which had arisen in the Board. On Oct. 23, 1933, the
Supreme Court had affirmed judgments entered as to those cases
and, on Nov. 20, 1933, had denied petitions for rehearing as to
three of those judgments. Following the Court’s issuance on Nov.
29, 1933, of the mandates as to the four cases, additional
petitions for rehearing were filed on May 21, 1934. In denying
these additional petitions, the Court noted that the applicable
predecessor to sec. 7481(a)(3) provided that “The decision of the
board shall become final * * * Upon the expiration of thirty days
from the date of issuance of the mandate of the Supreme Court, if
such court directs that the decision of the board be affirmed or
the petition for review dismissed.” Id. at 192. The Court held
that the “authoritative and explicit requirement of the statute”
precluded it from rehearing its decision; i.e., the additional
petitions for rehearing were filed after the time limits set
forth in the statute. Id.
R. Simpson & Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 225 (1944), also
arose in the Board. After the Supreme Court on Nov. 9, 1942, had
denied the taxpayer’s petition for certiorari as to a decision
that had affirmed the Board, and after the 25-day period in the
Court’s rules for the filing of a petition for rehearing of that
denial had expired, the taxpayer petitioned the Court for a
rehearing. The Court dismissed that petition for want of
jurisdiction. The Court noted that the applicable predecessor of
sec. 7481(a)(2)(B) provided that “The decision of the Tax Court
[the predecessor to this Court] shall become final * * * Upon the
denial of a petition for certiorari, if the decision of the Tax
Court has been affirmed”. Id. at 227. The Court held that this
statute deprived it of jurisdiction upon its denial of the
petition for certiorari and that “denial” under the statute
occurred when the Court’s denial of certiorari was final under
its rules; i.e., upon the expiration of the 25-day period allowed
for requesting reconsideration.
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