- 44 -
In addition, the Tax Court’s power to correct
clerical errors does not conflict with the statutory
framework establishing finality for that court’s
decisions. The Michaelses point out that the substance
of a decision becomes final and unappealable once the
statutory period for filing an appeal has expired. But
the same is largely true of district court decisions,
subject to such extraordinary remedies as those
contained in Rule 60(b), and yet the expiration of the
time for filing a notice of appeal does not prevent a
district court from acting under Rule 60(a) to correct
a clerical error in its judgment. See, e.g., American
Fed’n of Grain Millers Local 24 v. Cargill, Inc.,
15 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 1994). The Michaelses’ arguments
that the Tax Court should be prevented from taking the
same action because it is a creation of Article I
rather than Article III of the Constitution, or because
it is a court of limited jurisdiction, are not
persuasive. [Id. at 497; fn. ref. omitted.]
I am not unmindful of this Court’s opinions in Taub v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 741 (1975), affd. without published opinion
538 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976), and Hazim v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.
471 (1984). In Taub v. Commissioner, supra at 751, the Court
stated that “We find nothing in our new status * * * [under
Article I] which expands the narrow exception to the general rule
of finality of decisions carved out” in the case of fraud on the
Court that would give us jurisdiction to vacate a final decision.
In Hazim v. Commissioner, supra at 475, the Court repeated this
statement in concluding that this Court’s jurisdiction to set
aside a final decision is limited. The referenced statement in
these cases conflicts directly with the Supreme Court’s later
finding in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 865 (1991), that
this Court’s status in Article I means that this Court is no
Page: Previous 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011