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the quotation, namely R. Simpson & Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S.
225 (1944), dealt with a predecessor to this Court and, more
importantly, did not involve a motion under rule 60(b). (Nor did
Helvering v. Northern Coal Co., 293 U.S. 191 (1934), or Lasky v.
Commissioner, 325 U.S. 1027 (1957), deal with such a motion.7) I
see no reason why a need for finality is any greater for a
decision entered in a tax case heard by this Court as opposed to
a judgment entered in a tax case heard by a District Court. (I
have found nothing that prohibits a District Court from applying
rule 60(b) to relieve a party of a final judgment in a Federal
tax case.) As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated in Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. Commissioner,
supra at 578, with regard to the ability of this Court to apply
the equitable doctrines of tolling and estoppel which are applied
by District Courts: “The overlap between the district courts’
jurisdiction over refund suits and the Tax Court’s jurisdiction
over deficiency suits--both jurisdictions exclusive, but the
taxpayer allowed to choose between them--makes it anomalous and
confusing to multiply distinctions between the doctrines applied
7 The rule drawn from this trilogy of Supreme Court cases is
that a request for review by that Court in a civil case must be
timely filed within an applicable period prescribed by Congress
and that the untimely filing of such a request deprives the Court
of jurisdiction. See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S.
88, 90 (1994); Mo. v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990). The rule,
of course, is different when a Federal trial court applies the
principles of rule 60(b) within the time limits set forth
therein.
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