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longer an executive or administrative board, as were this Court’s
predecessors, but is a court of law that exercises a portion of
the judicial power of the United States to the exclusion of any
other function. This Court’s holdings in Taub and Hazim also
fail to take into account the fact that a proceeding under rule
60(b) is a continuation of the original proceeding and does not
require that the court overseeing the proceeding have an
independent basis of jurisdiction upon which to act.
Nor does my opinion change on account of any other case that
was decided before Freytag v. Commissioner, supra. As I see it,
the relevant cases as to the current powers of this Court are
those cases that pertain to this Court’s status as an Article I
court, with the most relevant of those cases being those which
were decided after Freytag. Freytag establishes that this Court
is a court of law with all of the incidental powers which pertain
thereto, rather than an administrative or executive board that
simply decides administrative inquires using limited powers
inclusive of no incidental principles of equity. Accord Flight
Attendants Against UAL Offset v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 572, 578
(7th Cir. 1999). The cases decided before Freytag do not address
this now well-settled status of this Court as a court of law that
performs exclusively judicial functions in a manner that is
harmonious with that of a District Court. None of these pre-
Freytag cases, therefore, has any bearing on the types of powers
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