Gwendolyn A. Ewing - Page 49

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               In support of its premise that the judicial review                     
          provisions of the APA do not apply to deficiency cases in this              
          Court, the majority primarily relies on O’Dwyer v. Commissioner,            
          266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1959), affg. 28 T.C. 698 (1957).7  The               
          taxpayer in O’Dwyer sought to compel the IRS to produce its                 
          entire administrative file, based in part on language in APA                
          section 706 directing the reviewing court to “review the whole              
          record”.  Id. at 578-580.  Perhaps out of concern that judicial             
          review of the “whole record” within the meaning of APA section              
          706 would be inconsistent with the established Tax Court practice           
          of not “looking behind” statutory notices of deficiency,8 the               
          court felt compelled to conclude that the Tax Court is not a                
          reviewing court for purposes of the APA.  Id. at 580.  The court            
          based that conclusion on the premise that the APA judicial review           
          provisions (APA sections 701-706) apply only to “formal”                    
          adjudications (i.e., those subject to the procedures set forth in           
          APA sections 554, 556, and 557).  Id.  Given subsequent caselaw             

               7  The majority also cites Nappi v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.              
          282 (1972).  In Nappi, the Court simply concluded that the Tax              
          Court is not an “agency” that is subject to the administrative              
          procedure (as opposed to judicial review) provisions of the APA             
          (APA secs. 551-559).  Id. at 284.                                           
               8  To the extent the Court was so concerned, such concern              
          appears to have been unfounded.  See S. Rept. 752, 79th Cong.,              
          1st Sess. 28 (1945); H. Rept. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 46                 
          (1946) (stating that the requirement of review upon the whole               
          record means simply “that courts may not look only to the case              
          presented by one party, since other evidence may weaken or even             
          indisputably destroy that case”).                                           





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