- 54 -
266, 267, 588, 591 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 304, 305,
626, 629. The foregoing would seem to deflate the notion that
Congress equates the word “determine” (and variations thereof)
with de novo proceedings in the context of Tax Court review.
b. Use of the Word “Determination” Elsewhere
Congress’s use of the word “determination” in a similar,
non-tax context is also instructive. Section 636(b)(1) of the
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. secs. 631-639 (2000), provides
that, in the case of certain “dispositive” motions assigned to a
magistrate, a district judge “shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the [magistrate’s] report” to which
objection is made. In interpreting that provision, the Supreme
Court stated:
It should be clear that on these dispositive
motions, the statute calls for a de novo determination,
not a de novo hearing. We find nothing in the
legislative history of the statute to support the
contention that the judge is required to rehear the
contested testimony in order to * * * make the required
“determination.” * * *
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980). The Court
quoted the following language from the House report accompanying
the bill that became the Federal Magistrates Act:
The use of the words “de novo determination” is
not intended to require the judge to actually conduct a
new hearing on contested issues. Normally, the judge,
on application, will consider the record which has been
developed before the magistrate and make his own
determination on the basis of that record, without
being bound to adopt the findings and conclusions of
the magistrate. * * *
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