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that the bill “[m]oves the point in time after which reasonable
administrative costs can be awarded to the date on which the
* * * [30-day letter] is sent”. H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 243
(1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 997.
Any interpretation that the 30-day letter constitutes a
“position” of the Government conflicts with the plain language of
section 7430(c)(7). The language of section 7430(c)(7) does not
include the 30-day letter among the instances in which the
Government is considered to have taken a “position”. Rather, the
“position” of the Government is defined as that taken in the
notice of deficiency or Appeals Office decision. It is an
established rule of statutory construction that where there is a
conflict between portions of the legislative history and the
words of the statute, the language in the statute controls. In
re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341 (7th Cir. 1989). The words
Congress chooses to put in the statute “represent the
constitutionally approved method of communication.” Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 952 F.2d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 1991);
Lenz v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 260, 268 (1993). “[U]nequivocal
evidence” of legislative purpose reflected in the legislative
history is required “to override the ordinary meaning of the
statute.” Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co., supra at 1241.
In this case, not only is “unequivocal evidence” in support of
reading the 30-day letter into subsection (c)(7) clearly absent,
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