Nield and Linda Montgomery - Page 10

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               granting taxpayers a right to contest the existence or                 
               amount of an underlying tax liability, Congress was                    
               concerned with tax liabilities asserted by respondent,                 
               rather than those originally computed and reported by                  
               the taxpayers themselves.  This concern is evident in                  
               the phrasing of section 6330(c)(2)(B), which permits a                 
               taxpayer to contest an underlying tax liability in the                 
               event that he or she has been denied a prior                           
               opportunity to contest that liability in the form of a                 
               “statutory notice of deficiency” or “otherwise.”  It is                
               nonsensical to permit taxpayers whose tax liabilities                  
               are self-determined to contest under section 6330 the                  
               liabilities they computed, voluntarily reported and                    
               declared to be correct under penalty of perjury.                       
          Respondent further asserts that there is no suggestion in the               
          legislative history underlying section 6330 that Congress                   
          intended to permit taxpayers to challenge taxes that were “self-            
          assessed” on a tax return.  Finally, respondent maintains that,             
          inasmuch as section 6330 constitutes a waiver of sovereign                  
          immunity, the provision should be narrowly construed in the                 
          Commissioner’s favor.                                                       
               Before proceeding, we briefly review the principles of                 
          statutory construction that guide our analysis.  It is well                 
          settled that in interpreting a statute, we start with the                   
          language of the statute itself.  Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v.            
          GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).  If the language of           
          the statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, we generally apply            
          it according to its terms.  United States v. Ron Pair Enters.,              
          Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Burke v. Commissioner, 105 T.C.             
          41, 59 (1995).  In Huntsberry v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-            
          748 (1984), we stated that “where a statute is clear on its face,           





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