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we would require unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose
before construing the statute so as to override the plain meaning
of the words used therein.” However, if a statute “is ambiguous
or silent, we may look to the statute’s legislative history to
determine congressional intent.” Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C.
494, 503 (2002) (citing Burlington N. R.R. v. Okla. Tax Commn.,
481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987)); see Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner,
120 T.C. 69, 89 (2003); Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1, 7
(2002).
Turning to section 6330(c)(2)(B), the provision plainly
states that a person may challenge “the existence or amount of
the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did
not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax
liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute
such tax liability.” The term “underlying tax liability” is not
defined in section 6320 or 6330, nor is there any specific
reference to that term in the legislative history of the
provisions. Taken in context, it is reasonable to interpret the
term “underlying tax liability” as a reference to the amounts
that the Commissioner assessed for a particular tax period. In
this regard, the term “underlying tax liability” may encompass an
amount assessed following the issuance of a notice of deficiency
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Last modified: May 25, 2011