Rita Grant Ndirika - Page 14

                                       - 14 -                                         
          management [of GC&D] that I felt that I had a claim related to              
          not only my current pregnancy, but also the fact that I had lost            
          a child in October 1998 * * * and that I intended to pursue that            
          claim when I left.”  Petitioner further testified that “To                  
          release my pregnancy related claim, I said to the firm, you know,           
          that I wanted a settlement amount equal to a year’s salary”.  We            
          found petitioner’s testimony to be vague, self-serving, uncorrob-           
          orated, inconsistent with the terms of the separation agreement,            
          and not credible.6                                                          
               As made clear by the following provisions of the separation            
          agreement, the settlement payments received thereunder were                 
          salary continuation severance payments.7                                    
               I.   Valuable Consideration                                            
                    In exchange for NDIRIKA’S entering into this                      
               Agreement, GC&D agrees to provide NDIRIKA with the                     
               following consideration:                                               


               6At the call of this case from the calendar, petitioner                
          informed the Court that she intended to call as a witness an                
          individual who during 2000 had been the managing partner (part-             
          ner) of GC&D and who would corroborate her claim that the pay-              
          ments at issue were received on account of personal physical                
          injuries or physical sickness.  At the call of this case for                
          trial, petitioner informed the Court that the partner whom she              
          intended to call “has come down with a case of amnesia”.  We                
          infer from petitioner’s failure to call that partner that his               
          testimony would not have been favorable to petitioner’s position.           
          See Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158,             
          1165 (1946), affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947).                           
               7The separation agreement contains a release and waiver                
          provision that appears to contain boilerplate language, and we do           
          not attribute any significance to that provision.                           





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011