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Here, petitioners acknowledge that the applicable divorce
documents are the 1995 decree and the 1997 decree (collectively,
the decrees) and that the decrees conflict with section
71(b)(1)(D) in that they state that, upon Okerson’s death,
petitioner must continue to make payments in the same amount as
the payments which he must pay before her death. Petitioners
argue, however, that the intent of the State court was to allow
petitioner to deduct the $117,000 and $33,500 as alimony.
Petitioners consider relevant the fact that petitioner paid both
of these amounts during Okerson’s lifetime and that he never had
to pay any of the post death payments described in the decrees.
Petitioners focus erroneously on the intent of the State
court as support for their argument that they are entitled for
Federal income tax purposes to deduct the disputed payments as
alimony. While State law establishes the property interests of
divorcing parties, Federal law controls the Federal income tax
treatment of those interests. Hoover v. Commissioner, supra at
844. Here, the applicable Federal law is set forth in section
71, which, in its present form, provides the exclusive means by
which a taxpayer may deduct a payment as alimony for Federal
income tax purposes. Id. at 844-845. Through that section,
Congress eliminated any consideration of intent in determining
the deductibility of a payment as alimony in favor of a more
straightforward, objective test that rests entirely on the
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