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fulfillment of explicit requirements set forth in section 71.
Id.; see also Rosenthal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-603
(“Whether or not the parties intended for the payments to be
deductible to petitioner, we must focus on the legal effect of
the agreement in determining whether the payments meet the
criteria under section 71.”). As the House Committee on Ways and
Means articulated in its report on section 71 in discussing the
need for such an objective test:
The committee believes that a uniform Federal standard
should be set forth to determine what constitutes
alimony for Federal tax purposes. This will make it
easier for the Internal Revenue Service, the parties to
a divorce, and the courts to apply the rules to the
facts in any particular case and should lead to less
litigation. The committee bill attempts to define
alimony in a way that would conform to general notions
of what type of payments constitute alimony as
distinguished from property settlements and to prevent
the deduction of large, one-time lump-sum property
settlements. [H. Rept. 98-432 (Pt. 2), at 1495-1495
(1984).]
Although the parties to a divorce proceeding may intend that
certain payments be considered alimony for Federal income tax
purposes, and a court overseeing that proceeding may intend the
same, Congress has mandated through section 71(b)(1)(D) that
payments qualify as alimony for Federal income tax purposes only
when the payor’s liability for those payments, or for any
payments which may be made in substitute thereof, terminates upon
the payee spouse’s death. Petitioners fail this requirement in
that both of the decrees state specifically and unequivocally
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