Milton M. Scarborough, Petitioner and Judy H. Scarborough Barrentine, Intervenor - Page 8

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          factor will (except in one circumstance) necessarily be                     
          considered positive or negative.2  With regard to the remaining             
          two factors in each group, the absence of the factor is                     
          considered neutral by the Commissioner.3  Because four factors              
          are common to both groups of six factors, there are actually                
          eight (4+2+2) separate and distinct factors set forth in section            
          4.03 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15.  No single factor is determinative,             
          and the list is not exhaustive.  See Washington v. Commissioner,            
          supra at 148; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125.                         
               Petitioner meets the threshold conditions set forth in                 
          section 4.01 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15 but does not satisfy the                 
          conditions set forth in section 4.02.  We must therefore consider           
          the eight separate and distinct factors set forth in section 4.03           
          of Rev. Proc. 2000-15.  Although respondent’s Appeals officer               
          based his determination principally on his conclusion that the              
          settlement agreement did not limit petitioner’s liability to one-           
          half of the 1999 liability, and he did not specifically address             


               2  One of the reciprocal factors is that “[t]he                        
          nonrequesting spouse has a legal obligation pursuant to a divorce           
          decree or agreement to pay the outstanding liability” (positive)            
          or, conversely, that the requesting spouse bears that obligation            
          (negative).  If neither spouse bears the obligation, the                    
          resulting absence is necessarily neutral.                                   
               3  In Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32, 45 (2004), we                
          stated that we consider the absence of significant benefit to be            
          a factor favoring relief (the Commissioner only considers such              
          absence to be neutral).  Since, as discussed infra, there is no             
          evidence one way or the other concerning significant benefit, we            
          may treat that factor as neutral for purposes of this report.               





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