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held itself out as the employer of each driver-employee to the
public, including to each trucking company client, the IRS, and
various State workers’ compensation plans. Respondent also
argues that if the Court were to allow petitioner to disavow
TLC’s status as the employer of each driver-employee, petitioner
must demonstrate by strong proof38 that TLC was not the employer
of each driver-employee. Respondent further maintains that if
the Court not only were to allow petitioner to disavow TLC’s
status as the employer of each driver-employee but also were to
reject respondent’s argument that the strong proof rule is
applicable in the instant case, the record nonetheless estab-
lishes that TLC was the employer of each driver-employee.
We consider first petitioner’s argument that, under the
doctrine of judicial estoppel, the Court should preclude respon-
dent from contending that TLC was the employer of each driver-
employee. According to petitioner, the Court should apply that
doctrine in the instant case because the Commissioner of Internal
38“Strong proof must be put forth by * * * [taxpayers] for
this Court to disregard the form in which they cast their trans-
actions in an arm's-length deal.” Miami Purchasing Serv. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 818, 830 (1981); see also Meredith Corp.
& Subs. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 406, 438 (1994). Strong proof
constitutes more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. See
Major v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 239, 247 (1981). In the instant
case, respondent contends that under each exclusive lease agree-
ment between TLC and each trucking company client TLC cast itself
as the employer of each driver-employee whom it leased to such
trucking company client and that therefore petitioner must
present strong proof that TLC was not in fact the employer of
each such driver-employee.
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