- 48 -48
Revenue (Commissioner) took the position in Beech Trucking Co. v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 428 (2002), that the driver-leasing
company in that case (i.e., Arkansas Trucking Service) was not
the employer of the truck drivers whom it leased to Beech Truck-
ing Co., Inc., whereas the Commissioner takes the inconsistent
position in the instant case that the driver-leasing company in
this case (i.e., TLC) was the employer of each driver-employee
whom it leased to each trucking company client.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel is designed to protect the
integrity of the courts by preventing a party from asserting
positions contradictory to or inconsistent with positions as-
serted in prior litigation. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.
742, 749-750 (2001); Leonard v. Southwestern Bell Corp. Disabil-
ity Income Plan, 341 F.3d 696, 702 (8th Cir. 2003); Huddleston v.
Commissioner, 100 T.C. 17, 26 (1993). We observed in Huddleston
v. Commissioner, supra at 26:
Judicial estoppel generally requires acceptance by a
court of the prior position and does not require priv-
ity or detrimental reliance of the party seeking to
invoke judicial estoppel. * * * Acceptance by a court
does not mean that the party being estopped prevailed
in the prior proceeding with regard to the ultimate
matter in dispute, but rather only that a particular
position or argument asserted by the party in the prior
proceeding was accepted by the court. * * *
The Court has discretion as to whether to invoke the doctrine of
judicial estoppel. Fazi v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 436, 446
(1995).
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