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We must decide whether Mr. Mansour has established that he
is an officer of WFO with authority to represent WFO before the
Tax Court. We determine Mr. Mansour’s capacity to represent WFO
under Ohio law. See Rule 60(c). As set forth below, we conclude
that Mr. Mansour has not established that he was properly
appointed as an officer of WFO with authority to represent WFO in
this proceeding, and accordingly we decline to recognize him as
WFO’s representative under Rules 24(b) and 63.
Ohio Rev. Code sec. 2735.04 (Anderson 2000) provides:
Under the control of the court which appointed
him, as provided in section 2735.01 of the Revised
Code, a receiver may bring and defend actions in his
own name as receiver, take and keep possession of
property, receive rents, collect, compound for, and
compromise demands, make transfers, and generally do
such acts respecting the property as the court
authorizes.
This provision has been construed as giving courts the ability to
expand or limit a receiver’s power. State ex rel. Celebreeze v.
Gibbs, 573 N.E.2d 62, 67-68 (Ohio 1991) (“We interpret this
statute as enabling the trial court to exercise its sound
judicial discretion to limit or expand a receiver’s powers as it
deems appropriate.”). Thus, in Ohio, a receiver has only the
authority granted to him by a court.
We do not read the order appointing Mr. Deborde “temporary
receiver/manager” of the business that was identified only as
“Bristol’s” as giving Mr. Deborde the power to appoint officers
for WFO and direct litigation in this Court. Mr. Deborde is one
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