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of the managers of Bristol’s. The powers that the Ohio court
specifically granted to Mr. Deborde involve only the day-to-day
management of the business, such as depositing receipts and
paying bills. We further note that Mr. Deborde’s appointment was
temporary until the court could hold a hearing “to determine the
management and running of the parties’ business known as
Bristol’s.” The stated purpose of the agreement was “to allow
the business to operate.”
In light of Mr. Deborde’s position as a manager of Bristol’s
and the limited powers described in the order appointing Mr.
Deborde “receiver/manager” of Bristol’s, we conclude that Mr.
Mansour has not established that the Ohio court granted Mr.
Deborde the authority to appoint corporate officers for WFO or to
direct the litigation of WFO’s case before this Court.9 Insofar
as Mr. Mansour has not established that he is an officer of WFO,
authorized to act on its behalf in this proceeding, he is not
qualified to represent WFO before this Court. See Rule 24(b).
Accordingly, we deny his motion to be substituted as WFO’s
9 Our interpretation of the order is further supported by
the order’s silence regarding the management of the proceedings
before this Court. The order incorporated an agreement between
Mr. and Mrs. Wolfe. At the time, Mr. and Mrs. Wolfe were aware
that respondent was seeking to enforce the settlement and that
they disagreed about how to respond. Mrs. Wolfe had expressly
disavowed any authority of Mr. Mansour to represent WFO in these
proceedings. In these circumstances, the order’s silence
regarding matters beyond the day-to-day deposit of receipts and
payment of bills strongly suggests that it was not intended to
cede to Bristol’s manager the authority to appoint corporate
officers who would make decisions for WFO in these proceedings.
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