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from the prison, Alice Springs was the closest residential
community to the base.
With respect to section 119(c)(2)(C), however, we conclude
that the lodging was not furnished in a common area (or enclave)
which is not available to the public and which normally
accommodates 10 or more employees. Indeed, petitioners’ lodging
was not available to the public as evidenced by the fact that
their specific lodging was restricted to personnel who work at
the base. The lodging, however, was furnished in a common area
with respect to the fact that the base lodging was located within
the same community as housing available to the general public.
The housing units were interspersed throughout Alice Springs and
not separated into gated communities. Section 1.119-1(d)(5),
Income Tax Regs., provides that a cluster of housing units does
not satisfy section 119(c)(2)(C) if it is adjacent to or
surrounded by substantially similar housing available to the
general public. Indeed, a public road accessible to the general
public ran through petitioners’ neighborhood. Moreover, we are
constrained to find that living in a residential suburb does not
fit the common parlance of a “camp”. These factors are
sufficient to convince us that the lodging was not a camp for
purposes of section 119(c). Therefore, petitioners’ lodging does
not constitute a camp within the meaning of section 119(c)(2)(C).
Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination on this issue.
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